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Frequent experiencewith regularities in our environment allowsus tousepredictive information to guideourdecisionprocess.However,
contingencies in our environment are not always explicitly present and sometimes need to be inferred. Heretofore, it remained unknown
howpredictive informationguidesdecision-makingwhenexplicit knowledge is absent andhowthebrain shapes such implicit inferences.
In the present experiment, 17 human participants (9 females) performed a discrimination task in which a target stimulus was preceded
by a predictive cue. Critically, participants had no explicit knowledge that some of the cues signaled an upcoming target, allowing us to
investigate how implicit inferences emerge and guide decision-making. Despite unawareness of the cue–target contingencies, partici-
pants were able to use implicit information to improve performance. Concurrent EEG recordings demonstrate that implicit inferences
rely upon interactions between internally and externally oriented networks, whereby prefrontal regions inhibit parietal cortex under
internal implicit control.
Key words: consciousness; decision-making; EEG; inferences; neural networks dynamics; prefrontal cortex
Introduction
Frequent exposure to regularities in our environment allows us to
exploit consistencies to anticipate upcoming events. For instance,
when strolling in an unfamiliar supermarket in search of a favor-
ite chocolate bar, one typically does not paymuch attentionwhen
passing by the detergents, but when the cookies come in sight,
attention starts to focus. Without being explicitly told where to
look for the product, the attentional system is able to use prior
information (i.e., experience with supermarket layouts) and cur-
rent sensory input to aid in the quest for chocolate. This example
demonstrates that, in addition to externally observable informa-
tion, internally oriented processes (e.g., memory, prospection)
play a crucial role in efficiently guiding our behavior in everyday
settings.
To understand decision-making in terms of network dynam-
ics, it is essential to understand the mechanisms by which infor-
mation is routed between brain regions. It has been proposed that
alpha activity serves as a mechanism that gates the flow of infor-
mation to relevant brain regions through inhibition (Fu et al.,
2001; Klimesch et al., 2007; Mathewson et al., 2009, 2011; Jensen
andMazaheri, 2010; vanDiepen et al., 2015; Vissers, 2018). Alpha
effects are typically measured after explicitly instructing partici-
pants about cues predicting a subsequent stimulus or indicating
the location of an upcoming target (Worden et al., 2000; Foxe and
Snyder, 2011), thereby mainly probing networks associated with
external information processing (i.e., the dorsal attention net-
work). In many cases, however, we learn to use predictive infor-
mation in our environment in an implicit manner (Chun, 2000;
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Significance Statement
Regularities in our environment can guide our behavior providing information about upcoming events. Interestingly, such
predictive information does not need to be explicitly represented to effectively guide our decision process. Here, we show how the
brain engages in such real-world “data mining” and how implicit inferences emerge. We used a contingency cueing task and
demonstrated that implicit inferences influenced responses to subsequent targets despite a lack of awareness of cue–target
contingencies. Further, we show that these implicit inferences emerge through interactions between internally and externally
oriented neural networks. The current results highlight the importance of prefrontal processes in transforming external events
into predictive internalized models of the world.
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Goldfarb et al., 2016), without the need of explicit knowledge
about existing stimulus associations (Cleeremans et al., 1998;
Cleeremans and Jime´nez, 2002; Frensch and Ru¨nger, 2003;
Wokke et al., 2017). In such settings, internally oriented networks
play an important role in the formulating and testing of internally
generated hypotheses (Christoff and Gabrieli, 2000) and in com-
paring past and current sensory inputs (Wilson et al., 2014). To
date, it remains unclear how predictive information from our
environment guides decision-making when explicit instructions
are absent. Further, it is unknown how internally and externally
oriented networks contribute to implicit inferences.
In the present study, we investigated how implicit contingen-
cies guide decision-making. Participants performed an orienta-
tion discrimination task in which a target stimulus was preceded
by a predictive cue. Critically, participants were not instructed
and had no explicit knowledge that some of the cues signaled an
upcoming target. Therefore, the information content of the cues
was not “directly observable” (Wilson et al., 2014; Schuck et al.,
2016) and required information from previous trials (i.e., fre-
quent exposure to cue–target pairings). During the task, we re-
corded electroencephalographic (EEG) signals, allowing us to
measure whether implicit cues were able to influence behavioral
responses, modulate alpha activity, and affect target processing,
despite the fact that subjects were not explicitly aware of the
meaning of the cues.
Materials andMethods
Participants. Seventeen participants (9 females; mean age  25.4 years;
SD 6.3) took part in this study for financial compensations. All partic-
ipants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and were naive to the
purpose of the experiment. All procedures complied with international
and institutional guidelines and were approved by the Institutional Re-
view Board of The City University of New York. Before the experiment,
participants were instructed on the task, after which all participants pro-
vided their written informed consent.
Experimental design and statistical analysis. Stimuli were presented full
screen (1024 768 pixels) on a 17 inch CRT monitor (Trinitron Multi-
scan 220GS, Sony) with a refresh rate set at 100 Hz. The monitor was
placed at a distance of 57 cm in front of each participant. Each trial
started with a centrally presented fixation cross that was presented for
1455, 1685, or 1915ms, afterwhich the cuewas presented for 750ms. The
cue consisted of four configurations of four L-shaped figures (Fig. 1b)
presented in each quadrant of the screen. After presentation of the cue, a
blank screen was presented for 400, 800, 1200, or 1600 ms, after which a
target or another blank screen was presented for 100 ms. Participants
were instructed to keep their eyes open and to minimize blinks from cue
onset until they gave their response to the target or the end of the trial
(Fig. 1a). A target stimulus consisted of a slightly left- or right-tilted
vertical Gabor patch (Fig. 1). We tilted the Gabor between 1° and 3° to
ensure that performance was kept below ceiling and above chance
(80% correct during practice trials; see below). After target presenta-
tion, participants had to indicate as quickly as possible the orientation of
theGabor (left or right) by pressing a corresponding left or right response
button. Next, participants provided their confidence about their deci-
sion, on a scale ranging from 1 to 4 by pressing one of four buttons.
Participants were instructed to assign a low value to a decision that was
accompanied by low confidence in being correct and a high value when
they were very confident about being correct. Participants were encour-
aged to make use of the whole scale. However, we did not present a
confidence scale or an explicit question on the screen during the experi-
ment due to time considerations. In this way, participants gave their
metacognitive judgment during the blank that followed the target, im-
mediately after the first-order task response. During our pilot studies
(n 60, spread over five different sessions), we arrived at the conclusion
that we should not exceed 2 h of experimentation, and therefore de-
cided to use the current experimental design. On trials when no target
Figure 1. a, Participants had to respond as quickly as possible to a slightly right- or left-tilted vertical Gabor stimulus. Before target presentation, a cue signaled either an upcoming target (100%
validity) or a blank (66% validity). Participants were unaware of the relationship between the cue stimulus and target presentation during the experiment. b, Cues weremade up of configurations
of L-like shapes. The top left and bottom right configurations determined the identity of the cue (target or nontarget cue). For illustration, four of the eight cues are shown.
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was presented, the participants were instructed not to respond and wait
for the onset of the next trial (2 s). We customized two (computer) mice
to create four response buttons that registered responses through a
Teensy LC Board at microsecond temporal resolution.
A target cue (Fig. 1b) always predicted an upcoming target (100%
valid), whereas a nontarget cue was followed by a target on one-third of
the trials or no target on two-thirds of the trials). We used four different
target cues and four different nontarget cues. The top right and bottom
left configuration of the cues determined the cue type (i.e., the top right
and bottom left configuration remained the same within the cue type;
Fig. 1). Participants performed two separate sessions at least/1 week
apart. Crucially, in the first session participantswere not instructed about
the types of cues signaling target stimuli or about the general purpose of
the cue stimuli in the experiment. The cue parameters were based on data
from the pilot studies and were set such that participants were able to
learn the contingencies between cue and target without gaining explicit
knowledge about themeaning of the cue stimuli (i.e., explicitly recognize
them as being cues). In the second session, we explicitly instructed par-
ticipants about the identity of the cues, explaining to the participants that
the top right and bottom left configuration of each cue was predictive of
trial type and which cue was most likely to be followed by a blank.
In both sessions, participants started with 120 trials of practice to get
accustomed to the task. At the end of the first session, we determined
whether participants gained explicit knowledge about the nature of the
cue stimuli. In four steps, we probed participants’ knowledge about the
cues. First, we asked participants whether they noticed anything about
the stimuli appearing in the experiment. Second, we asked whether they
noticed if the stimulus with the L-shaped figures had any purpose in the
experiment. Next, we asked whether they noticed whether specific con-
figurations of L shapes signaled an upcoming target or whether configu-
rations of specific L shapes were more related to the appearance of a
blank. Finally, we showed participants the cues and tested whether they
could tell the difference between the cues and their relation to target
presentation.Of all 17 participants, only 1 noticed a relationship between
the cues and the appearance of a target stimulus. For the other 16 partic-
ipants, there was no explicit knowledge of the presence of cues on any of
the above-described questions (Chun and Jiang, 2003; Geyer et al., 2012;
Goujon et al., 2014). All analyses were based on these 16 participants.
In each session, we presented 720 trials equally divided over six blocks.
Within each block, 48 (validly) cued target trials, 24 (invalidly) noncued
target trials, and 48 (validly) cued blank trials (i.e., nontarget cue trials
without a target) were presented in pseudorandomorder. Participants took
a 10min break after completing three blocks. Each session lasted2 h.
Behavioral analyses. To assess whether response times, target discrim-
ination accuracy, and metacognitive judgments differed depending on
implicit cue type, we calculated reaction times (RTs) and task perfor-
mance (d; see Macmillan and Creelman, 2004) on first-order task re-
sponses and metacognitive sensitivity (meta-d) and metacognitive
efficiency (meta-d–d; Maniscalco and Lau, 2012; Fleming and Lau,
2014) based on confidence judgments. First-order task sensitivity (d)
and metacognitive sensitivity (meta-d) are bias-free measures of task
performance (left from right target orientation in this case) and the abil-
ity to distinguish right from wrong decisions, respectively (both in units
of first-order d). By subtracting d from meta-d (metacognitive effi-
ciency), we were able to measure metacognitive sensitivity relative to
changing levels of first-order task performance (Fleming and Lau, 2014).
Because first-order task performance is known to influence metacog-
nitive sensitivity (Fleming and Lau, 2014), it is necessary to assess
metacognitive sensitivity relative to different levels of first-order task
performance. We performed three separate 2 (first and second half of
the experiment)  2 (target and nontarget cue) repeated-measures
ANOVAs on reaction times, performance (d), and second-order task
performance (meta-d). Unfortunately, confidence judgments of two
participants were not registered due to a technical error in the implicit
condition, basing the second-order performance analyses on 14 partici-
pants. All behavioral analyses were performed using Matlab (Matlab
12.1, MathWorks), type 2 SDT (signal detection theory) scripts (Manis-
calco and Lau, 2012), and JASP (version 0.8.6).
EEG measurements and analyses. EEG was recorded and sampled at
1000Hz using a 32-channel EASYCAP system. Two additional electrodes
were placed on the outer eye canthi to record eye blinks. Electrode im-
pedance was kept to 20 k. Off-line, the data was high-pass (0.5 Hz)
and low-pass (40 Hz) filtered and then rereferenced to the left and right
mastoid. The data were epoched at 0.7 to 	1.7 s around cue onset.
These time windows avoided edge artifacts resulting from time–fre-
quency decomposition (see below). We removed trials containing irreg-
ularities due to eye blinks or other artifacts by visually inspecting all trials.
To increase spatial specificity and to filter out deep sources, we converted
the data to spline Laplacian signals (Perrin et al., 1989; Cohen, 2015).
As we expected to measure implicit contingency effects in the second
half of the first session, the last 70 target cue with target and last 70
nontarget cuewithout target trialswere selected after artifact rejection for
all analyses (after artifact rejection, these 70 trials roughly corresponded
to the data gathered in the second half of the session). We selected the
nontarget cue trials without a target to make sure the trials in each con-
ditionwere taken from the same phase of the experiment (i.e., target cues
followed by a target and nontarget cues without a target were just as
frequent in each block). We decomposed the cue-locked, epoched EEG
time series for these trials into their time–frequency representations by
convolving themwith a set ofMorlet wavelets (frequencies ranging from
1 to 30 Hz in 1 Hz steps). Complex wavelets were created by multiplying
perfect sine waves with a Gaussian. The range of the width of the Gauss-
ian was set between 4 and 10 in 40 logarithmically scaled steps, to have a
good trade-off between temporal and frequency resolution for each fre-
quency. We applied the fast Fourier transform to the EEG data and the
Morlet wavelets, after which these were multiplied in the frequency do-
main. Next, the inverse FFT was applied, allowing us to define an esti-
mate of frequency-specific power at each time point and an estimate of
the frequency-specific phase at each time from the resulting complex
signal (van Driel et al., 2015). We normalized the data (dB Power tf 
10  Log10[Power tf/Baseline Power f]) using an interval of 300 to 0
ms relative to cue onset as baseline. For our hypothesis, we specifically
focused on signals in the alpha frequency band between cue offset and
earliest target onset (i.e., a time window of 0–400 ms after cue offset).
To further examine the way information might be gated via alpha
oscillatory mechanisms, we assessed measures of inter-regional func-
tional connectivity in the alpha range. Consistencies of the difference of
time–frequency phase values between two channels in the alpha band
across trials were computed [intersite phase clustering (ISPC); Siegel et
al., 2012; Cohen, 2014]. We chose P4 as our “seed” electrode based on
previous studies demonstrating the involvement of right parietal cortex
in attention and alpha oscillations (Bareham et al., 2018). We used the
same preprocessing steps as described above for the time–frequency
analyses and a baseline period of300 to 0 ms before cue onset for both
cue types.
We performed a 3 (channel location)  2 (target and nontarget
cues)  2 (implicit/explicit condition) repeated-measures ANOVA on
mean alpha power changes and a 2 (channel location)  2 (target and
nontarget cue)  2 (implicit/explicit condition) repeated-measures
ANOVA on mean ISPC changes.
Finally, we were interested whether implicit information influenced
neural signals related to target processing. Therefore, we epoched the
EEG data from 100 to 600 ms around target onset, using the same
preprocessing steps as described above. Unfortunately, for two partici-
pants there were too many artifacts (
50% of trials) in the epoch after
target presentation, likely because of the long interval between cue onset
and response in which we instructed participants not to blink, resulting
in 14 participants for our target ERP analyses.We focused on the P3a and
P3b components, which have been shown to be highly associated with
stimulus environment updating processes (i.e., comparing present and
previous stimuli in working memory) and differences in levels of access
consciousness, respectively (Donchin, 1981; Polich and Kok, 1995; Ser-
gent et al., 2005;Muller-Gass et al., 2007; Naccache et al., 2016;Wokke et
al., 2016). In light of findings demonstrating that the P3b indexes differ-
ent levels of access consciousness, we tested ERP differences in both the
implicit as well as the explicit condition. For the P3a component, we
selected mid central electrode Cz values between 250 and 400 ms, while
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we selected central parietal electrode Pz values between 350 and 500 ms
after target onset for P3b comparison (Polich, 2007).
All signal-processing steps were completed using EEGlab (Delorme
and Makeig, 2004) and X code (Cohen, 2014) in Matlab (Matlab 12.1,
MathWorks), and statistical analyses were performed using Matlab
(Matlab 12.1,MathWorks), JASP (version 0.8.6), and SPSS (version 20.0;
IBM).
Results
Behavioral results
To determine whether participants were able to use implicit in-
formation to guide their behavior, we compared reaction time
differences and differences in task performance (d) between im-
plicitly (validly) cued and implicitly (invalidly) noncued targets
(Fig. 1). We expected differences to occur specifically in the last
half of the experiment when the cue–target context had been
established (i.e., after extensive exposure to pairings of target cue
with the presentation of a target stimulus). Therefore, we split the
data into the first and second halves of the session (Fig. 2). Fur-
ther, we assessed whether metacognitive performance (meta-d
and metacognitive efficiency) was affected by the implicit cues.
For task performance there was a significant main effect of first/
second half (block) of the experiment (F(1,15) 8.75, p 0.010).
For both RT and task performance, there was a significant inter-
action effect between block and cue type (RT: F(1,15) 5.17, p
0.038; d: F(1,15)  14.43, p  0.002). These interactions reflect
differences in RT and performance that change over the course of
the experiment depending on the cue type that preceded a target.
To investigate these interactions further, we compared cued tar-
gets versus noncued targets for each half of the experiment sepa-
rately using paired t tests (two tailed). As expected, there were no
differences in the first half of the experiment for both RT [t(15)
0.058, p  0.955, BF10 (Bayes factor for each model against the
nullmodel) 0.256] and performance (t(15)0.23, p 0.821,
BF10 0.262). In contrast, for the second half of the experiment,
there were significant differences in RT and performance de-
pending on cue type (RT: t(15)3.144, p 0.007, BF10 7.639;
d: t(15)3.058, p 0.008, BF10 6.596; Fig. 2). These results
demonstrate that participants learned to use the cues to increase
the efficiency of their performance despite not having any explicit
knowledge about the presence of cues.
We repeated the same analyses for the second session, in
which participants had explicit knowledge about the information
conveyed by the cues. Importantly, we observed a significant
main effect of cue for both RT (F(1,15)  8.76, p  0.010) and
performance (F(1,15)  12.57, p  0.003). In addition, we also
observed a block  cue interaction for RT (F(1,15)  5.37, p 
0.035). Reaction times were only significantly faster for cued tar-
gets in the second half of the session (RT first half: t(15)1.74,
p 0.103, BF10 0.872; RT second half: t(15) 3.57, p 0.003,
BF10  15.889), while performance was better in both the first
and second halves of the experiment for cued targets compared
with noncued targets (d first half: t(15) 2.50, p 0.025, BF10
2.628; d second half: t(15) 2.77, p 0.014, BF10 4.052).
Formetacognitive performance, we observed amain effect for
block (first three blocks vs last three blocks) in the implicit con-
dition for metacognitive efficiency (F(1,13)  8.16, p  0.014).
Participants were better in determining right from wrong deci-
sions in the second half of the experiment comparedwith the first
half (t(13)  4.15, p  0.001, BF10  34.97). In the explicit con-
dition, we observed a main effect of cue type for meta-d (F(1,15)
4.68, p 0.047). Participants had higher meta-dwhen targets were
validly cued (t(15) 2.16, p 0.047, BF10 1.58).
EEG results
To determine whether alpha activity was influenced when (im-
plicit/explicit) information guided behavior, we compared alpha
power changes in a 400 ms time window after cue offset (before
earliest target onset) between trials in which a target cue and a
nontarget cue were presented. We expected to measure implicit
contingency effects in the second half of the first session and
therefore used the trials from this part of the experiment for this
main analysis (see Materials and Methods). We observed a sig-
nificant interaction (F(2,30) 15.79, p 0.001) among cue type
(target/nontarget), channel location (P4, C4, and Fp2; see Mate-
rials and Methods), and awareness condition (explicit/implicit).
These results demonstrate that, depending on awareness and
electrode location, there is a difference in alpha power between
the two cues. Next, we performed a 2  2 repeated-measures
ANOVA per cue awareness condition separately. We observed a
significant interaction between cue type and channel location in
both the implicit condition (F(2,30)  5.86, p  0.007) and the
explicit condition (F(2,30)  11.60, p  0.001). In the implicit
condition, there was lower alpha power over Fp2 (t(15)  2.65,
p 0.018, d 0.66, BF10 3.346) for target cues compared with
nontarget cues. In contrast, we observed a smaller alpha decrease
in P4 for a target cue comparedwith a nontarget cue (t(15) 2.65,
p 0.018, d 0.66, BF10 3.334; Fig. 3b,c). Interestingly, in the
explicit conditionwe observed the opposite pattern. Alpha power
was higher over Fp2 (t(15)  2.61, p  0.02, d  0.65, BF10 
3.147) for target cues compared with nontarget cues, and alpha
Figure 2. Participants responded faster (left) and performed better (right) when a target was preceded by a target cue than when preceded by a nontarget cue. Bars are the mean 
within-subject SEM. * indicates a significant difference (see results).
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decreased more in P4 after a target cue compared with a nontar-
get cue (t(15) 3.08, p 0.008, d 0.77, BF10 6.897; Fig. 3b,c).
ForC4, we observed no differences between cue types (all p values

0.05).
To examine this effect further and test whether the observed
cue type effects in P4 and Fp2 are related to implicit learning of
cue–target contingencies and the buildup of task context, we in-
vestigated whether alpha power differences between cue types
differed depending on which half of the implicit session trials the
differences were taken from. We observed a significant interac-
tion among session half (first or second), cue type, and channel
(F(1,15) 20.53, p 0.001). For both Fp2 and P4, we observed a
cue-type and session-half interaction (Fs(1,15) 
 6.54, p values
0.023). No differences were observed in either P4 or Fp2 be-
tween the two cue types (t values0.339, all p values
0.744) in
the first half of the implicit session (Fig. 3c, dashed lines are values
from the first half of the implicit session).
To examine whether the observed power differences were ac-
companied by changes in interactions between frontal and pari-
etal regions, we assessed measures of inter-regional functional
connectivity (alpha phase synchrony) by calculating the ISPC
between channels P4 and Fp2. We observed a significant main
effect of cue (F(1,15)  4.71, p  0.047) and a nonsignificant
interaction between cue type and condition (F(1,15)  3.22, p 
0.093). In the implicit condition, we observed increased alpha-
band synchronization between P4 and Fp2 (t(15)  3.08, p 
Figure 3. a, Electrodeswith alphaactivity differences between cue types in the first half of the explicit conditionwereused for further analyses (left). Topographic plot of alpha activity differences between
cue types in the cue–target interval in the implicit condition and explicit condition (approximately the last half of the trials for each condition).b, Time–frequency plot of electrodes P4 and Fp2 of differences
betweencuetypes.c,Weobservedasmalleralphapowerdecreaseintherightparietal regionaftertargetcuepresentationcomparedwithnontargetcuepresentation. Incontrast,alphapowerdecreasedinright
frontal regions exclusively in response to a target cue. The dashed lines represent themean values observed in the first half of the experiment. In the explicit condition,we observed an opposite pattern: alpha
power increased in the right frontal channel Fp2,while it decreased in P4 after target cue presentation. Bars represent themeanwithin-subject SEM. * indicates a significant difference (see results).
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0.008, BF10 6.892) after a target cue was presented comparison
with a nontarget cue (Fig. 4a; we plotted ISPC differences be-
tween P4 and all other electrodes for illustration purposes).We ob-
served no significant difference in the explicit condition (t(15) 
0.606, p 0.553, BF10 0.300; Fig. 4b).
However, in the implicit condition we observed different
amounts of alpha power for both cue types. Therefore, our ISPC
results could be confounded as a result of different signal-to-
noise ratios (Siegel et al., 2012; Bosman et al., 2012; Pesaran et al.,
2018; for review, see Cohen, 2014; Bastos and Schoffelen, 2016).
We therefore tested whether ISPC differences were still present
after stratification of alpha power. Trials from both cue type con-
ditions were randomly discarded until mean alpha power was
similar for both cue conditions in channels Fp2 and P4 (where we
observed alpha power differences between the cue types). These
analyses confirm the results with all trials (t(15) 2.83, p 0.01,
BF10  4.37). In addition, we split the target–cue data in half
based on median alpha power and tested whether ISPC differ-
ences existed between high and low alpha power trials. No differ-
ence between high and low alpha power trials were found (t(15)
0.60, p 0.56, BF10 0.30).
To determine how neural measures relate to behavior, we
correlated RT and da differences to cued and noncued targets
with alpha power decreases after target cue offset for P4 and Fp2
and parietal–anterior frontal functional connectivity changes af-
ter target cue presentation. In the implicit condition, we observed
a significant correlation between parietal–frontal ISPC change
and the RT effect [r  0.769, n  16, R2  0.59, FDR (false
discovery rat) 0.05, BF10 78.73; Fig. 5]. We did not find any
significant correlations that survived the multiple-comparisons
correction between RTs and alpha power changes or between d
and ISPC change (all r values0.335, FDR
 0.05). These find-
ings demonstrate a strong link between enhanced alpha phase
synchrony betweenP4 andFP2 and the speeding of responses due
to implicitly learning of cues predicting an upcoming target
stimulus.
Finally, we investigated whether neural signals related to tar-
get processing differentiated depending on preceding cue type
(target vs nontarget cue) in both the implicit and explicit condi-
tions (see Materials and Methods). We examined whether we
could find differences in P3a and P3b ERP components associ-
ated with “context updating” of the stimulus environment
(Donchin, 1981; Polich and Kok, 1995) and linked to differences
in access awareness (Naccache et al., 2016).We observed a signif-
icant cue (target/nontarget cue) ERP type (P3a/P3b) session
(implicit/explicit) interaction (F(1,13)  8.95, p  0.010). In the
implicit condition, a significant cue (target/nontarget cue) 
ERP type (P3a/P3b) interaction (F(1,13) 11.19, p 0.005) was
found. In this condition, we observed an increased P3a when a
target was preceded by a nontarget cue compared with when a
target was preceded by a target cue (t(13)  3.61, p  0.003,
BF10  14.627; Fig. 6a). No significant P3b effect was observed
between cue types in the implicit condition (t(13)  1.95, p 
0.072, BF10  1.180). In the explicit condition, we observed a
nonsignificant cue (target/nontarget cue) ERP type (P3a/P3b)
interaction (F(1,13) 3.54, p 0.082). In contrast to the implicit
condition, we found an increased P3b in the explicit condition
when a target was preceded by a nontarget cue compared with
when a target was preceded by a target cue (t(13)  3.22, p 
0.007, BF10  7.902; Fig. 6d). No significant P3a effect was ob-
served between cue types in the explicit condition (t(13) 0.084,
p  0.934, BF10  0.271). These results seem to corroborate
previous findings demonstrating the influence of contextual pro-
cesses on the P3, where P3 activity is modulated when the model
or context of a stimulus environment needs to be updated
(Donchin, 1981; Donchin andColes, 1988; Polich andKok, 1995;
Todorovic et al., 2011; Seppa¨nen et al., 2012; Silverstein et al.,
2015; Bang and Rahnev, 2017; Li et al., 2018).
Discussion
In everyday life, we are able to use predictive information in our
environment to guide our behavior. However, sometimes infor-
mation is not readily available and needs to be inferred
(O’Doherty et al., 2001; Wilson et al., 2014). In such cases, it is
necessary to compare past and current sensory inputs and use
prior experience to select relevant information to anticipate up-
coming events (Chun et al., 2011; Wilson and Niv, 2012).
In this experiment, implicit cues were used to investigate how
unconscious contingencies may be able to control our decision
process. Specifically, we focused on whether implicit cueing was
able to affect behavioral responses in a discrimination task and
modulate oscillatory neural activity in the alpha frequency range.
Results demonstrate that participants were able to use implicit
cues to improve performance and speed up responses (Chang et
al., 2015; Pinto et al., 2015; Stein and Peelen, 2015; Meijs et al.,
2018; Fig. 2). We observed a specific decrease of right frontal
alpha power when a target stimulus was implicitly cued (Fig. 3c),
whereas an alpha power decrease over right parietal cortex di-
Figure4. a,Weobserved significantly larger alphaphase synchrony betweenP4 and Fp2 for
target cues in the cue–target interval. We plotted the period from cue onset to target onset for
illustration purposes, while only comparing mean ISPC changes in the interval after cue offset
(shaded areas are  within-subject SEM). b, In the explicit condition, we did not observe
differences after cue offset. * indicates a significant difference (see results).
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minished after the presentation of an implicit target cue. These
findings corroborate previous findings demonstrating that pre-
frontal cortex becomes recruited when information needs to be
inferred (Christoff andGabrieli, 2000;Wilson et al., 2014; Schuck
et al., 2017). Furthermore, it has been shown that alpha power
increases in parietal cortex when attention becomes internally
oriented (Ray and Cole, 1985; Schupp et al., 1994; Cooper et al.,
2003). Interestingly, we observed a specific increase in functional
connectivity (alpha phase synchrony) between right parietal and
right prefrontal channels when implicit information was used
(Fig. 4). This change in functional connectivity in response to an
implicit target cue correlated strongly with behavioral effects
(Fig. 5). Finally, ERP differences (Fig. 6) between cued and non-
cued targets showed that cued targets were implicitly anticipated
(Summerfield et al., 2008; Todorovic et al., 2011; Chennu et al.,
2013). Figure 7 summarizes these results and provides a sche-
matic of the mechanisms mediating implicit inferences.
Alpha oscillations and gating
Alpha activity has long been considered a marker for increased
inhibition (Lopes da Silva, 1991). Recently, it has been put for-
ward that alpha oscillations play a key role in the gating of the
flowof information by suppressing the processing of information
in task-irrelevant networks (Klimesch et al., 2007; Jensen and
Mazaheri, 2010;Mathewson et al., 2014;Groen et al., 2016). It has
been demonstrated that a shift of attention to either the left or
right visual hemifield decreases alpha oscillations in the con-
tralateral hemisphere, while increasing them in the ipsilateral
Figure 5. a, RT decreases are highly correlated with functional connectivity changes between P4 and Fp2. b, Sequential analysis of the Bayesian correlation pairs illustrates the strength of the
effect and the number of participants included.
Figure 6. ERPs to targets on trials preceded by a target cue resulted in a smaller P3a in the implicit condition (top left and bottom left) and a smaller P3b in the explicit condition (top right and
bottom right). Shaded areas arewithin-subject SEM. * indicates a significant difference (see results).
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hemisphere (Worden et al., 2000; Sauseng
et al., 2005; Thut et al., 2006). Further-
more, recent studies have shown that al-
pha power increases in the dorsal stream
when a task relies on ventral stream pro-
cessing (Jokisch and Jensen, 2007; Wokke
et al., 2014). In the present study, we ob-
served a smaller decrease of parietal alpha
oscillation after presentation of a target
cue when participants became sensitive to
implicit cueing (Fig. 3). It has been previ-
ously shown that alpha power in parietal
regions increases when attention becomes
internally directed, suggesting the neces-
sity of active inhibition of external sensory
input for internally driven mental opera-
tions (Ray and Cole, 1985; Schupp et al.,
1994; Cooper et al., 2003). Further, Sest-
ieri et al. (2010) observed functional competition between inter-
nally (memory) and externally (perception) driven processes,
where parietal cortex operated in a push–pull manner depending
on the task engaging either internally (search in memory) or
externally (search in the environment) oriented networks. Here,
enhanced internally driven processes could dampen typical pari-
etal alpha power decreases due to functional competition (Fox et
al., 2005). This push–pull hypothesis seems to be supported by
the recruitment of prefrontal regions, strongly associated with
the evaluation of internally generated information (Christoff and
Gabrieli, 2000; Schuck et al., 2017; Dixon et al., 2018). Further, a
seemingly opposite pattern was observed in the explicit condi-
tion, when attention could be externally oriented (Figs. 3, 7).
Lesions to orbitofrontal cortex have been shown to induce a
state in which subjects become solemnly dependent on informa-
tion from the outsideworld that is directly observable (utilization
behavior; Lhermitte, 1983; Brazzelli and Spinnler, 1998; Besnard
et al., 2010), while internal models and information about con-
text are no longer accessible (similar effects have also been ob-
served in reversal learning tasks; Dias et al., 1996; Wilson et al.,
2014). These findings have been associated with a disrupted bal-
ance in network functioning, where orbitofrontal damage results
in a disinhibited state of parietal cortex (Lhermitte et al., 1986).
Interestingly, the current results show increased functional con-
nectivity between parietal and prefrontal channels, exclusively in
the implicit condition (Figs. 3, 4). Measures of functional con-
nectivity provide us with information about the formation and
functional integration of networks, working either in concert or
in a push–pull fashion (Fox et al., 2005; Srinivasan et al., 2007;
Wokke et al., 2015). In the last decades, competing network dy-
namics have been demonstrated by opposed activity levels in
intrinsic “outward oriented” networks and the “internally ori-
ented” default-mode network on a variety of tasks (Raichle et al.,
2001; Fox et al., 2005; Weissman et al., 2006; Kelly et al., 2008;
Hampson et al., 2010;Wokke et al., 2015; Zabelina and Andrews-
Hanna, 2016). As depicted in Figure 7, our results indicate a
similar dynamic of internally and outward oriented network ac-
tivity when participants learn to use implicit information. Fur-
ther, the strength of the functional connectivity change between
parietal and prefrontal regions strongly correlated with the be-
havioral RT effect. However, we did not find a significant corre-
lation between the behavioral effect and alpha power in either
parietal or prefrontal regions. These findings indicate that specif-
ically the orchestration of activity in internally and externally
oriented networks could be fundamental for situations when in-
formation needs to be inferred.
Prefrontal cortex and inferential decision-making
Activity in the orbitofrontal cortex (Brodmann areas 10, 11, and
47) has been consistently associated with support of adaptive
decision-making by uncovering predictive values associated with
stimuli in our environment (Walton et al., 2010; Boorman et al.,
2016). The connectivity between orbitofrontal cortex and sen-
sory, frontal, striatal, and hippocampal regionsmakes this region
highly suited for the generation and testing of hypotheses (Frey
and Petrides, 2002; Bar et al., 2006) and for providing predictions
about specific outcomes associated with stimuli (Rudebeck and
Murray, 2014; Goldfarb et al., 2016). Recently, the above-
described observations have been captured in a “state-space”
model in which the orbitofrontal cortex plays a crucial role. This
state-space theory of orbitofrontal cortex (Gershman and Niv,
2010;Wilson et al., 2014; Schuck et al., 2016, 2017) focuses on the
context inwhich decisions are beingmade andwhat the decision-
making agent considers “the state of the world” at themoment of
the decision (Schuck et al., 2017). Such states can be connected to
external information (e.g., explicit cues) or they can contain in-
ternally generated information, which cannot be directly ob-
tained from the immediate environment and has to be inferred
(e.g., implicit cues or task context). Specifically, the orbitofrontal
cortex seems critical for the representation of states that include
such partially observable information (Brown et al., 2010;Wilson
et al., 2014). The present findings are contributing to a growing
amount of evidence demonstrating the critical role that prefron-
tal cortex plays in using information in the environment that is
not directly observable.
Another influential proposal about the workings of the (or-
bito)frontal cortex involves the signaling of emotions and its in-
fluence on decision-making, the so-called “somatic marker
hypothesis” (Damasio et al., 1991; Lang, 1994; Stalnaker et al.,
2015; Poppa and Bechara, 2018). Central to the somatic marker
hypothesis is that decision-making can be influenced through
signaling of bioregulatory processes that are expressed in the
body. In the current experiment, increased arousal elicited by
target cues could be used as a cue itself. Unfortunately, the pres-
ent study lacks spatial specificity, making it difficult to assess the
role of key structures thought to be critical in the processing of
such somatic markers (e.g., the amygdala, orbitofrontal, somato-
sensory, and insular cortex). Future work combining fMRI and
Figure 7. Left, Implicit inferences engage internally oriented networks, enhancing processing via anterior prefrontal regions.
Competitive network dynamics result in decreased externally oriented network activity, where alpha activity serves as a mecha-
nism to gate the flow of information within specific networks. Right, Explicit instructed inference results in an opposite pattern,
whereby externally oriented networks are engaged.
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physiological measures (e.g., skin conductance, ECG) could pro-
vide useful insight into the role of somaticmarkers in the buildup
of implicit inferences.
P3a/P3b: prediction and access consciousness
To further examine the consequences of implicit cueing, we in-
vestigated how cued and noncued target stimuli influenced P3a/
P3b activity. A rich literature describes the role of the P3 in
context updating (Donchin, 1981), in which a current stimulus is
compared with a preceding stimulus in working memory
(Donchin, 1981; Donchin andColes, 1988; Polich andKok, 1995;
Silverstein et al., 2015). We therefore compared P3a and P3b
responses to cued and noncued targets. These P3 components
have been frequently studied using “oddball” designs, linking the
P3 to updating of stimulus context (Donchin, 1981; Summerfield
et al., 2008; Todorovic et al., 2011; Chennu et al., 2013). Interest-
ingly, we observed an enhanced P3a when a target stimulus was
preceded by a nontarget cue in the implicit condition, whereas we
found an increased P3b in the explicit condition.
It has been suggested that the P3a component relies more on
automatic (unconscious) processes (Muller-Gass et al., 2007),
whereas the P3b component is linked to access consciousness
(Faugeras et al., 2012; Naccache et al., 2016; but see Silverstein et
al., 2015). These findings are in line with a recent study investi-
gating the relationship between top-down expectations and ac-
cess consciousness (Meijs et al., 2018). In that study, the authors
observed that access awareness of a predictive stimulus is neces-
sary to actively use top-down predictions for subsequent target
processing (in an attentional blink design where T1 predicted
T2). The present results and the findings of the study by Meijs et
al. (2018) indicate that a predictive stimulus needs to be percep-
tually processed all the way up to the level of access awareness to
be effective, but that the meaning of the stimulus (i.e., that the
stimulus is in fact predictive) can still remain inaccessible for
introspection without discarding its functionality. Further, Meijs
et al. (2018) demonstrated that prediction errors could be trig-
gered outside of conscious awareness. In the current study, we
observed related effects by observing a P3a difference between
cued and noncued targets in the implicit condition, while we
found a P3b difference in the explicit condition that was not
present in the implicit condition. These findings suggest that
unconscious/implicit context updating effects proceed more au-
tomatically than in the conscious/explicit form (Faugeras et al.,
2012; Naccache et al., 2016).
Previous work suggests that unconscious/automatic elicited
responses are relatively short lived, while conscious detection re-
sults in more long-term behavioral adaptations (Cohen et al.,
2009; van Gaal and Lamme, 2012), although it remains debated
what the consequences of such differences exactly are. It would be
interesting to investigate how long lived the observed effects of
implicit learning are (e.g., by testing participants on multiple
occasions in the implicit condition to examine the longevity of
the effect of implicit learning). In the present study, we also did
not focus on how or when implicit control of attention became
accessible for introspection. It would be very fascinating to inves-
tigate how the use of implicit information progresses toward ex-
plicit knowledge and to observe whether such a transition would
proceed in a gradual or in an all-or-none manner (Sergent and
Dehaene, 2004;Windey andCleeremans, 2015; King et al., 2016).
It could be that hypotheses about implicit information gradually
become strong enough, reaching increasingly higher signal-to-
noise levels, resulting in stable (neural) representations (Schurger
et al., 2010) and updating of internal predictive models of the
environment (O’Reilly et al., 2013). Such internalization of stim-
ulus–outcome events (Cleeremans, 2011; Buzsa´ki et al., 2014;
Wokke et al., 2017) could pave the way for implicit information
to become accessible for introspection.
Limitations
In the present study, we investigated how implicit contingencies
guide decision-making. The current results implicate competi-
tive network dynamics during implicit inference. We also ana-
lyzed electrophysiological changes in response to explicit cues.
However, with the current scalp EEG measures, precise neural
localization of the differences between the implicit and explicit
condition is not possible. Although we increased spatial specific-
ity by converting the data to spline Laplacian signals (Cohen,
2015), our EEG results still suffer from limited spatial resolution.
Recently, fMRI measures and appropriate experimental designs
have proven to be able to reveal activity related to predictive
stimuli (van Loon et al., 2016; de Lange et al., 2018). It would be
interesting to use fMRI in future studies to localize regions in-
volved during explicit and implicit inferences.
Another limitation of the present work is that we are not able
to make claims about a causal relation between the observed
behavioral and electrophysiological effects. Although the above-
discussed lesion studies (Lhermitte et al., 1986; Damasio et al.,
1991; Wilson et al., 2014) provide supporting evidence about the
role of prefrontal cortex in implicit inference, future work could
combine the present design with brain stimulation (e.g., trans-
cranial magnetic stimulation) to assess the causal effects of dis-
rupting (or injecting alpha rhythms into) prefrontal and/or
parietal cortex.
Although the present sample size is in line with previous stud-
ies demonstrating alpha effects (van Dijk et al., 2008;Mathewson
et al., 2009; Marshall et al., 2015; Becker et al., 2018), and the
alpha effect sizes (Cohen’s d 0.66) in the implicit condition are
reasonable (medium-large), future studies could be valuable in
determining whether the observed effects gain further strength
through the aggregation of data (using Bayesian statistics).
Theremay also be concerns about themetacognitivemeasures
used in the current design. Participants were instructed to pro-
vide an estimate about the quality of their decision immediately
after the first-order response. However, we did not present a
confidence scale or explicit question about their confidence on
the screen during the experiment. The current setup could result
in “sticky fingers,” where second-order responses are mapped
onto the same button or hand as first-order choices. The use of
different hands for these different responses would more defini-
tively rule out contributions from these types of response biases.
Finally, in the current study, hit rates were relatively high for
some participants, creating potentially unstable estimates of
second-order performance (Bor et al., 2017; Ruby et al., 2018). A
staircase procedure before the experiment could address this is-
sue in future studies.
Conclusion
In daily life, our decisions are frequently guided by regularities in
our environment. However, such contingencies are not always
explicitly present and sometimes need to be inferred. Using con-
tingency cueing, we show that implicit inferences influenced
responses to subsequent targets despite a lack of awareness of
cue–target contingencies. These implicit inferences emerge
through changes in internally and externally oriented neural net-
works. The current results demonstrate that prefrontal cortex
plays an important role in the transformation of externally driven
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stimulus–outcome events into predictive internalized models of
the world.
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